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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey year, the Illinois Supreme Court and appel-
late courts addressed various state and local tax issues. The
supreme court examined state issues relating to the constitutional-
ity of amendments to the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act and the
Use Tax Act,' the imposition of criminal liability for failing to file a
Retailers' Occupation Tax return, the imposition of the Liquor
Control Act tax on low-alcohol content beverages,3 the meaning of
the "Airport Authority Uses" exemption from property taxes 4 and
* Partner, Chapman and Cutler, Chicago, Illinois; B.B.A., 1977, University of Cin-
cinnati; J.D., 1980, Georgetown University Law Center; L.L.M., 1985, DePaul Univer-
sity College of Law.
** B.S.C., 1984, DePaul University; J.D. candidate, 1990, Loyola University of
Chicago.
1. See infra notes 8-47 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 48-81 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 82-109 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 110-43 and accompanying text.
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the extinguishment of in rem tax liens on properties sold at county
tax sales.' The supreme court also examined a local issue relating
to the medical appliance exemption from the imposition of Chi-
cago Sales Tax.6 The appellate court examined the validity of the
imposition of the Chicago Transaction Tax on charges billed for
on-line database searches. 7
II. STATE TAXATION ISSUES
A. Retailers' Occupation Tax Act and Use Tax Act
1. Constitutionality of Amendments to the Retailers'
Occupation Tax Act and Use Tax Act
In Russell Stewart Oil Co. v. State,8 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that recent amendments to the Use Tax Act ("UTA")9 and
the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act ("ROTA") 10 (collectively,
"Acts") were unconstitutional under the commerce clause" of the
United States Constitution. ' 2 The amendments at issue established
a lower tax rate on the sale of gasohol produced from ethanol dis-
tilled in Illinois or in a state with reciprocal tax benefits relating to
the sale of gasohol. 1 3 Prior to the amendments, all sales of gasohol
5. See infra notes 144-58 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 159-91 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 192-216 and accompanying text.
8. 124 Ill. 2d 116, 529 N.E.2d 484 (1988).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 439 (Supp. 1988). The Use Tax Act provides in
pertinent part that "[a] tax is imposed upon the privilege of using in this State tangible
personal property ... [S]uch tax is at the rate of 6.25% of either the selling price or the
fair market value, if any, of such property as provided herein." Id. para. 439.3.
10. Id. paras. 440 -53. The Retailers' Occupation Tax Act provides in pertinent part
that "[a] tax is imposed upon persons engaged in the business of selling tangible personal
property... at retail at the rate of 6.25% of the gross receipts from such sales of tangible
personal property made in the course of such business." Id. para. 441.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion provides: "The Congress shall have the Power .. . [t]o regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States." Id.
12. Russell, 124 111. 2d at 123, 529 N.E.2d at 486.
13. Id. at 120, 529 N.E.2d at 485. Effective September 1, 1985, both acts were
amended to provide in pertinent part:
[Wlith respect to gasohol as defined in the Use Tax Act in which the ethanol
has been distilled in Illinois, such tax shall be imposed at the rate of 0% up to
and including December 31, 1983; and at the rate of 1% from January 1, 1984
up to and including August 31, 1985; and at the rate of 2% ... from September
1, 1985 up to and including May 31, 1986; and at the rate of 3%... from June
1, 1986 up to and including December 31, 1992, and at the rate of 5%
thereafter.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, paras. 439.3, 441 (1987).
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were taxed at the same rate. 4 The plaintiff in Russell filed an ac-
tion in the circuit court of Cook County seeking injunctive relief
and a declaration that the amendments to the Acts were unconsti-
tutional.' 5 The circuit court held that the amended statutes were
unconstitutional because the purpose and effect of each was dis-
criminatory. 6 Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(a)(1),
the circuit court's decision was appealed directly to the supreme
court. 7
Noting that the United States Supreme Court has consistently
interpreted the commerce clause as prohibiting a state from enact-
ing laws that favor local business over out-of-state business, 8 the
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the amended statutes vio-
lated the commerce clause because they discriminated against in-
terstate commerce in favor of local interests."' In reaching this
conclusion, the supreme court first addressed the State's claim that
the amended statutes did not discriminate against interstate com-
merce because of a reciprocity provision contained in both stat-
utes. 20  The State asserted that the presence of the reciprocity
14. Russell, 124 Ill. 2d at 120, 529 N.E.2d at 485.
15. Id. at 121, 529 N.E.2d at 485. The plaintiff claimed that the amendments vio-
lated the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. Id. See supra note 12 for the lan-
guage of the commerce clause.
16. 124 Ill. 2d at 121, 529 N.E.2d at 485-86.
17. Id. at 119, 529 N.E.2d at 485. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(a)(1) allows a
direct appeal to the supreme court in cases in which a United States or Illinois statute has
been held invalid. ILL. S. CT. R. 302(a)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 302(a)(1)
(Supp. 1988).
18. 124 Ill. 2d at 121, 529 N.E.2d at 486 (citing Lewis v. BT Investment Managers,
Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851)).
19. 124 Ill. 2d at 123, 529 N.E.2d at 486. The court based its conclusion on the fact
that the tax benefit extended only to gasohol manufactured from ethanol that has been
distilled in Illinois. Thus, the amendment gave Illinois ethanol producers a price advan-
tage over out-of-state producers. Id. at 486-87. The court noted that the Supreme Court
has consistently held that this type of preferential treatment is prohibited by the com-
merce clause. Id. at 487. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984);
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984); and Boston Stock Exchange
v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). The court also noted that in Archer Daniels
Midland Co. v. State ex rel. Allen, 315 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1982), the Minnesota
Supreme Court struck down a similar statute holding that the statute "openly places a
more onerous tax burden upon out-of-state gasohol simply 'because of its origin in an-
other state'" and therefore is per se unconstitutional. Russell, 124 Ill. 2d at 124, 529
N.E.2d at 487 (citing Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State ex rel. Allen, 315 N.W.2d at
599 (quoting Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935))).
20. Id. at 124, 529 N.E.2d at 487. The amendment to both acts contained a provision
extending the lower tax rate to gasohol produced in a state offering the same benefits to
Illinois distillers of ethanol. The amendments both provided:
If the Department of Revenue certifies that another jurisdiction outside the
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provision clearly showed that the purpose of the amendments was
not to protect Illinois producers from out-of-state competition,21
but rather it was to equalize the taxes of out-of-state ethanol pro-
ducers and Illinois ethanol producers.22 The State further argued
that this was not a protectionist purpose, and therefore, the
amended Acts were not per se unconstitutional under the com-
merce clause.23
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the State's claim, conclud-
ing that the reciprocity provisions did not make the amended Acts'
discriminatory effect on interstate commerce less offensive.24 The
supreme court also determined that the reciprocity provision had
the effect of shielding Illinois producers of ethanol from competi-
tion from producers in any state that does not reciprocate. 25 The
court concluded that this type of burden on interstate commerce
was inconsistent with the commerce clause and that the reciprocity
provisions of the Acts would not validate the discriminatory legis-
State of Illinois provides an exemption, credit, or refund from that jurisdiction's
motor fuel excise tax, sales tax or similar tax that is applicable to gasohol which
contains denatured ethanol distilled in Illinois, then gasohol containing ethanol
distilled in the other jurisdiction and purchased on or after the effective date of
this amendatory Act of 1985 shall be eligible for the exemption provided in this
Section only to the level of exemption, credit, or refund that gasohol containing
ethanol distilled in Illinois would receive in such other jurisdiction, but not to
exceed the level of exemption provided for gasohol containing ethanol distilled
in Illinois.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, paras. 439.3, 441 (1987).
21. 124 Ill. 2d at 125, 529 N.E.2d at 487.
22. Id. The State claimed that the reciprocity provision eliminated the economic dis-
advantage of Illinois ethanol producers that resulted from legislation in other jurisdic-
tions favoring the sale of gasohol within those states. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 125, 529 N.E.2d at 487-88. The supreme court relied on the United States
Supreme Court decisions in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366
(1976) and New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988). In Cottrell, the Supreme
Court invalidated a Mississippi regulation that prohibited the sale of out-of-state milk
products within Mississippi unless the other state allowed the sale of Mississippi milk
products within that state. Cottrell, 424 U.S. at 381. In reaching the conclusion that the
regulation violated the commerce clause, the Supreme Court stated that a reciprocity
provision will not stand under the commerce clause because it was enacted in response to
protectionist legislation in another state. Id at 379. The Court noted that the commerce
clause provided a state with the necessary reciprocity by allowing one state to sue another
in federal court in order to challenge any regulation claimed to violate the commerce
clause. Id. at 380. In New Energy, the Court struck down a similar statute holding that a
reciprocity provision does not justify the economic disadvantage imposed upon an out-of-
state seller. 486 U.S. at 275. The Court also rejected the State of Ohio's claim that the
provision encouraged other states to enact ethanol subsidies concluding that the only
thing the statute encouraged was favorable treatment for Ohio produced ethanol. Id. at
280.
25. Russell, 124 Ill. 2d at 127, 529 N.E.2d at 488.
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lation under the commerce clause.26
The court then addressed the State's contention that the amend-
ment to UTA, which changed the definition of gasohol,"' should be
severed from the other portions of the amended UTA.2 ' The State
claimed that the amended definition was not violative of the com-
merce clause because it did not distinguish between interstate and
intrastate commerce.29 The supreme court declined to address the
issue of whether the amended definition was severable from the
remainder of the UTA amendments because the court held the
provision itself to be unconstitutional.3 °
Although the court agreed with the State's assertion that the
amended definition was neutral on its face,3' the court concluded
that the amended definition also discriminated against interstate
commerce.12 The court reached this conclusion by applying the
balancing test set forth by the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce
Church Inc.,33 which weighs the burden on interstate commerce
against the local benefit. The court noted that when state legisla-
tion is found to discriminate against interstate commerce in its pur-
pose or effect, the statute will not stand under the balancing test,
unless the state can justify the legislation by showing that the local
benefits outweigh the burden and that nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives are not available. 4 In applying the Pike balancing test, the
court concluded that the amended definition would have the prac-
tical effect of imposing a disproportionately heavy burden on inter-
state commerce. 35  Accordingly, the claimed benefits of the
26. Id. at 127-28, 529 N.E.2d at 488-89 (citing Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,
458 U.S. 941, 958 (1982) and Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979)).
27. The amendment also set forth a new definition of gasohol eligible for the reduced
tax. Amended section 3 of the UTA provides as follows: "gasohol means motor fuel
which is no more than 90% gasoline and at least 10% denatured ethanol which contains
no more than 1.25% water by weight and is obtained from cereal grains or food
processed by-products essentially derived from cereal grain." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
para. 439.3 (Supp. 1988).
28. Russell, 124 Ill. 2d at 128, 529 N.E.2d at 489.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 129, 529 N.E.2d at 489.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 130, 529 N.E.2d at 490.
33. Id. at 129-30, 529 N.E.2d at 489 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142).
34. Id. at 130, 529 N.E.2d at 490. The court based its conclusion on the fact that as
of 1985, 12% (equaling 66.5 million gallons) of gasohol produced in the United States
would not be eligible for the tax benefit while 99.4% of the ethanol produced in Illinois
would be eligible for the tax benefit. Id.
35. Id. at 131, 529 N.E.2d at 490 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336
(1979); Hunt v. Washington State Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977)).
1990]
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amended definition did not "justify the disproportionately heavy
burden imposed on interstate commerce. '36
The State had contended that by limiting the tax benefit to ce-
real-based grain ethanol, the amended definition would stimulate
the demand for grain and help remedy problems caused by large
grain surpluses. 37 The State also claimed that the amended defini-
tion would increase the demand for gasohol,38 which in turn would
further health and welfare objectives 39 and reduce the United
States' dependence on foreign oil.4 The court dismissed the State's
claim that by encouraging the use of ethanol, the amended defini-
tion could improve the State's health4' and reduce the nation's de-
pendence on foreign oil. 2 Although the court agreed that the
State's interest in stimulating the demand for grain was a legiti-
mate objective, the court concluded that providing a tax benefit for
gasohol, without consideration of its raw materials, would still
stimulate the demand for grain.43
Concluding that the State failed to justify the discriminatory ef-
fect in terms of the claimed local benefits and to prove that there
were not any nondiscriminatory alternatives available, 44 the court
held the amendments unconstitutional. Because the amendments'
benefits did not outweigh the putative local benefits, the new defini-
tion of gasohol violated the commerce clause.4
36. Id. at 132, 529 N.E.2d at 491 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979)).
37. Id. at 131-32, 529 N.E.2d at 490.
38. Id. at 132, 529 N.E.2d at 490.
39. Id. The State based this conclusion on the fact that gasohol was an "environmen-
tally benign fuel additive to gasoline," unlike leaded additives. Id.
40. Id. The State claimed that because gasohol acted as "an octane enhancer and
gasoline extender," the amount of foreign oil imported into the United States would be
reduced. Id.
41. Id. at 132, 529 N.E.2d at 491. According to the court, there was no chemical
difference between cereal-based grain ethanol and ethanol distilled from raw materials.
Therefore, offering a tax benefit for the use of gasohol regardless of the raw materials in
the ethanol would have encouraged the use of ethanol without the discriminatory effect
on interstate commerce. Id.
42. Id. The State did not present any evidence that the change in the definition
would reduce the nation's dependence on foreign oil. Id.
43. Id. at 134, 529 N.E.2d at 491. The court based its conclusion on the fact that
88% of gasohol produced in the U.S. was cereal-grain based. Id. The court also noted
that the regulation was economically-based and that such state regulations having a di-
rect burden on interstate commerce have been struck down consistently. Id. at 133, 529
N.E.2d at 491 (citing Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Westinghouse
Elec. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S.
318 (1977)).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 134, 529 N.E.2d at 491-92.
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Unlike last year's decision in Goldberg v. Johnson,46 which held
unconstitutional Illinois' tax on interstate long-distance telephone
calls, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Russell is relatively
unimportant. As indicated by the court itself, the opinion applied
clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent to con-
clude that the amended statutes (including the change in the defini-
tion of gasohol) violated the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution.
2. Criminal Liability for Failing to File Retailers' Occupation
Tax Returns
In People v. Parvin,47 the Illinois Supreme Court held that corpo-
rate officers cannot be held criminally liable under section 13 of
ROTA for failing to file monthly ROTA returns for the corpora-
tion.48 The Parvin defendant was the president and sole share-
holder of a corporation that operated a restaurant and lounge
called Park Town Hall.4 9 The corporation, Park Town Hall, Inc.,
was required to file monthly ROTA returns because it was in the
business of selling food and beverages at retail.50 The corporation
failed to file these returns between June 1983 and June 1984.1 The
Winnebago County circuit court convicted the defendant under
ROTA for failing to file the monthly ROTA returns.5 2 On appeal,
the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision on the
grounds that the defendant was not a person engaged in the busi-
ness of selling personal property at retail, and therefore he could
not be held criminally liable.- 3 The State appealed the decision to
the Illinois Supreme Court.5 4
46. 117 Il. 2d 493, 512 N.E.2d 1262 (1987) (per curiam), aff'd sub nom. Goldberg v.
Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989). For an extended discussion of Goldberg, see Berry and
Sawner, Taxation: State and Local, 20 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 655, 656-62 (1989).
47. 125 Ill. 2d 519, 533 N.E.2d 813 (1988).
48. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 452 (Supp. 1988). During the time period at issue
in this action, ROTA section 13 provided in pertinent part that "any person engaged in
the business of selling tangible personal property at retail in this State who fails to file a
return... is guilty of a class 4 felony." Id.
49. Parvin, 125 Ill. 2d at 522, 533 N.E.2d at 814.
50. Id. ROTA section 3 provides in pertinent part that "every person engaged in the
business of selling tangible personal property at retail in this state... shall file a return
with the Department." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 442 (Supp. 1988).
51. 125 Ill. 2d at 522, 533 N.E.2d at 814.
52. Id. at 521, 533 N.E.2d at 813.
53. Id. See People v. Parvin, 164 Ill. App. 3d 29, 517 N.E.2d 663 (2d Dist. 1987).
54. Parvin, 125 Ill. 2d at 521, 533 N.E.2d at 813. See Parvin, 164 I11. App. 3d 29, 517
N.E.2d 663. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the State's petition for leave to appeal
in order to resolve the conflict with the appellate court's decision in People v. Johnson,
1990] 639
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The supreme court first addressed the State's contention that the
defendant could be held liable under section 13 of the ROTA be-
cause he was a "person" within the meaning of the ROTA.5 5 The
court dismissed the State's argument, determining that the issue
was not whether the defendant was a "person" within the meaning
of the ROTA, but rather, whether the defendant was a "person
engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at re-
tail."' 56 The court also concluded that by including both the corpo-
ration and its officers and shareholders in the interpretation of
"person engaged in the business of selling tangible personal prop-
erty," the State ignored the fundamental distinction between the
corporation and its shareholders."
The supreme court then turned to the defendant's contention
that the distinct language and the legislative intent of ROTA's pen-
alty provisions supported the claim that corporate officers cannot
be criminally liable for failing to file the corporation's monthly
ROTA returns.5 8 Although the legislature expressly provided for
criminal liability of corporate officers in the fraudulent filing provi-
sion, it did not include corporate officers in the failure to file
provision. 9
In addressing the defendant's argument, the supreme court con-
sidered the appellate court's decision in People v. Johnson,60 which
rejected this precise argument as not supported by the language of
the ROTA.6' The supreme court noted that because of the clear
differences in the wording of the two provisions, it could not agree
131 I11. App. 3d 803, 476 N.E.2d 56 (5th Dist. 1985). Parvin, 125 I11. 2d at 522, 533
N.E.2d at 814. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text for discussion ofJohnson.
55. Parvin, 125 Ill. 2d at 523, 533 N.E.2d at 814. Section 1 of ROTA defines person
as including "natural individual[s]." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 440 (1987).
56. Parvin, 125 I11. 2d at 523, 533 N.E.2d at 814.
57. Id. at 523-24, 533 N.E.2d at 814. The court noted that it was well-established
that a corporation was a separate and distinct legal entity from its shareholders and of-
ficers. Id. at 523, 533 N.E.2d at 814 (citing Main Bank v. Baker, 86 I11. 2d 188, 204, 427
N.E.2d 101 (1981)). The court also noted that corporate officers are not directly liable
under ROTA for the payment of the tax. Parvin, 125 Ill. 2d at 523, 533 N.E.2d at 814.
58. Parvin, 125 I11. 2d at 524, 533 N.E.2d at 815. The fifth paragraph of section 13
makes it a felony to file a fraudulent ROTA return. The provision includes language
referring to "any person engaged in" and to "any officer or agent of a corporation en-
gaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail in this state." The
sixth paragraph of section 13 (the failure to file provision), however, does not include the
language referring to corporate officers. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 452 (Supp. 1988).
59. Parvin, 125 Ill. 2d at 524, 533 N.E.2d at 815.
60. 131 I11. App. 3d 803, 476 N.E.2d 56 (5th Dist. 1985).
61. Parvin, 125 Ill. 2d at 524, 533 N.E.2d at 815. The Johnson court stated that the
foregoing argument "is supported neither by reason nor the language of the Act." Id.
(quoting Johnson, 131 I11. App. 3d at 807, 476 N.E.2d at 59).
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with the Johnson court's rejection of the argument.62 Instead, the
supreme court determined that the differences showed a legislative
intent not to impose criminal liability on corporate officers and
agents for failure to file.63 The court recognized that this interpre-
tation was supported by the principle that statutes should not be
construed in a way which renders language superfluous. 6
Next, the supreme court recognized that criminal and penal stat-
utes are subject to strict construction before they may be applied to
a specific situation.65 Noting that the failure to file provision does
not mention officers and agents and that there is sufficient evidence
that the legislature did not intend to hold officers and agents crimi-
nally liable, the court concluded that the failure to file provision
did not extend liability to corporate officers and agents.66
The court also duly rejected the State's contention that the de-
termination of whether a corporate officer will be liable is depen-
dent upon the officer's corporate duties. 67 First, the court stated
that the State's argument ignored the legal distinction between a
corporation and its shareholders and officers.68 Second, the court
noted that the State failed to indicate what corporate duties would
subject an officer to liability.69 Finally, the court stated that the
statute does not contain a limitation based on an individual's cor-
porate duties.70 Absent this limitation, the court theorized that a
retail clerk selling goods for a corporate taxpayer could be liable
under the State's construction. 7' The court concluded that the leg-
islature could not have intended this result.72
The defendant had argued that the name on the corporation's
certificate of registration determines who is the person engaged in
the retail business. 73 The court declined to determine whether the
62. 125 Ill. 2d at 525, 533 N.E.2d at 815.
63. Id.
64. Id. The court determined that the language imposing liability on corporate of-
ficers in the fraudulent filing provision would be superfluous if the failure to file provision
was construed to impose liability on corporate officers. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 525-26, 533 N.E.2d at 815-16.
67. Id. at 526, 533 N.E.2d at 816.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 526-27, 533 N.E.2d at 816.
72. Id. at 527, 533 N.E.2d at 816.
73. Id. Park Town Hall, Inc. was named on the certificate of registration. In address-
ing this issue, the court considered the decision in People v. Floom, 52 I11. App. 3d 971,
368 N.E.2d 410 (1st Dist. 1977), which rejected this argument. The defendants in Floom
were corporate officers who had refused to allow DOR investigators to examine certain
1990]
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registered taxpayer is the person engaged in the business of selling
at retail for all purposes.74 Instead, the supreme court limited its
holding to section 13's failure to file provision, concluding that the
statutory language, "person engaged in the business of selling tan-
gible personal property at retail," does not include officers and
agents of a corporation required under the ROTA to file returns.75
Based on this conclusion, the defendant could not be criminally
liable for failure to fie returns on the corporation's behalf.76
Finally, the court weighed the State's contention that the de-
fendant may be held criminally liable under section 5-5(a) of the
Criminal Code of 1961.77 The court noted that the statute does not
apply unless the individual is "engaged in conduct which would
have been criminal if performed in his own name or behalf."178  Be-
cause the court determined that the defendant was not engaged in
the business of selling tangible personal property at retail, he could
not be subject to criminal liability for failure to file a ROTA return
in his own name or on his own behalf under section 5-5(a).79 Ac-
cordingly, the supreme court affirmed the appellate court's deci-
sion that the defendant was not criminally liable for failing to file
the corporate ROTA returns.8 0
The court's decision in Parvin represents a common sense ap-
proach to statutory construction by the judiciary; Parvin sends a
books and records. At that time, section 13 prohibited "[a]ny person engaged in the
business of selling tangible personal property at retail" from wilfully violating any rule or
regulation. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, para. 452 (1984). The Floom court concluded that
for section 13 purposes, the defendants, as the corporate decision-makers, were persons
engaged in selling tangible personal property at retail. Foom, 52 111. App. 3d at 977, 368
N.E.2d at 415. The supreme court noted that the appellate court disagreed with the
Floom court's decision. Parvin, 125 Il. 2d at 527, 533 N.E.2d at 816. In reaching this
conclusion, the appellate court determined that for ROTA purposes, the person engaged
in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail is the same as the registered
taxpayer. Id. Because the defendant was not the registered taxpayer, the appellate court
concluded that the defendant could not be considered the person engaged in the business
of selling tangible personal property at retail. Id. at 527-28, 533 N.E.2d at 816.
74. Id. at 528, 533 N.E.2d at 816.
75. Id. at 528, 533 N.E.2d at 816-17.
76. Id. at 528, 533 N.E.2d at 817.
77. Id. Section 5-5(a) of the Illinois Criminal Code provides: "[a] person is legally
accountable for conduct which is an element of an offense and which, in the name or in
behalf of a corporation, he performs or causes to be performed, to the same extent as if
the conduct were performed in his own name or behalf." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
5-5(a) (1987).
78. Parvin, 125 Ill. 2d at 528-29, 533 N.E.2d at 817.
79. Id. at 529, 533 N.E.2d at 817.
80. Id.
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powerful message to state and federal lawmakers to exercise preci-
sion and clarity in legislative drafting.
B. Liquor Control Act
In Federated Distributors, Inc. v. Johnson,s" the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution'2
required that "New Products"83 and wine coolers 4 be taxed at the
same rate. 5 The court also held that section 8-1 of the Liquor
Control Act ("Act")8 6 was unconstitutional to the extent that it
does not provide a basis on which to tax these products equally. 7
The appellees in Johnson were importing distributors or manu-
facturers of New Products.8 The case arose after the DOR re-
scinded its decision to tax New Products in the same category as
wine coolers.89 The DOR informed the appellees that New Prod-
ucts fell within the statutory definition of "spirits" and, therefore,
would be taxed at $2.00 per gallon.9° Appellees sought a prelimi-
81. 125 Ill. 2d 1, 530 N.E.2d 501 (1988).
82. ILL. CONST. 1970, article IX, § 2. The uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitu-
tion provides: "[i]n any law classifying the subjects or objects of non-property taxes or
fees, the classes shall be reasonable and the subjects and objects within each class shall be
taxed uniformly." Id.
83. New Products are a low-alcohol content beverage defined by the parties to this
action as follows: "New Products are not produced by either distillation or fermentation,
but contain not less than one-half of one percent (1/2 of 1%) and not more than fourteen
percent (14%) alcohol by volume. They are produced from any combination of water,
flavoring, fruit juices, vegetable juices, sugar, sugar syrup, preservatives and artificial car-
bonation, and are fortified by the addition of spirits." Johnson, 125 Ill. 2d at 6, 530
N.E.2d at 503.
84. The court noted that the only difference between New Products and wine coolers
is that wine coolers are fortified by the addition of wine; New Products are fortified by the
addition of spirits. Id.
85. Id. at 21, 530 N.E.2d at 510.
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, para. 158 (1985). Section 8-1 imposes a tax upon the
privilege of engaging in the business as a manufacturer or importing distributor of alco-
holic liquor in the following manner:
* Beer - $.07 per gallon
" Wine containing 14% or less alcohol by volume - $.23 per gallon
* Wine containing more than 14% alcohol by volume - $.60 per gallon
* Alcohol and Spirits - $2.00 per gallon
Id.
87. Johnson, 125 Ill. 2d at 22, 530 N.E.2d at 510.
88. Id. at 6, 530 N.E.2d at 503.
89. Id. at 7, 530 N.E.2d at 503. The appellees had contacted the DOR requesting a
ruling regarding the amount of tax the appellees would be assessed as manufacturers and
importing distributors of New Products. Id. at 6, 530 N.E.2d at 503. The appellees
received two letters from the Legal Services Bureau of the DOR assuring them that New
Products would be taxed at the same rate as wine coolers. Id. at 6-7, 530 N.E.2d at 503.
90. Id. at 7, 530 N.E.2d at 503.
644 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 21
nary injunction to prevent the DOR from imposing the $2.00 per
gallon tax on New Products.9' The trial court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the higher tax on New Products.92 The trial court's
decision was reversed on appeal and the appellate court ordered
that the tax rate applied to wine and wine coolers be applied simi-
larly to New Products. 93 The DOR appealed the decision to the
Illinois Supreme Court.94
The supreme court first concluded that section 8 of the Liquor
Control Act was subject to the uniformity clause of the Illinois
Constitution because it was enacted under the State's taxing
power.95 The court then applied the test set forth by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue. 96 In order for a tax classification to be valid under the
uniformity clause, the Searle test requires that there be a real and
substantial difference between the classifications and that the "clas-
sification bear[s] some reasonable relationship to the object of the
legislation or to public policy." 97
In applying the Searle test, the court first considered whether
there was a real and substantial difference between wine coolers
and New Products.9 s The DOR contended that the difference be-
tween the source of the product's alcoholic content99 was a real and
substantial difference and that the difference was supported by the
91. Id. The taxpayers claimed that it is unconstitutional to tax New Products in a
more burdensome manner than wine containing less than 14% of alcohol by volume.
Alternatively, they argued that New Products should escape taxation altogether. Id.
92. Id. The trial court determined that the DOR's technical reading of the Act was
correct. Id. The court also concluded that the classifications established by the Act were
reasonable and not arbitrary. Id.
93. Id. at 7, 530 N.E.2d at 504. The appellate court found that there was no real and
substantial difference between wine coolers and New Products and that taxing New Prod-
ucts at a higher rate would "bear no rational relationship to the evil sought to be reme-
died by the Act." Id. at 7-8, 530 N.E.2d at 504.
94. Id. at 8, 530 N.E.2d at 504.
95. Id. at 11, 530 N.E.2d at 505 (citing Bardon v. Nudelman, 369 Ill. 214 (1938)). In
Bardon, the court stated in dicta that section 8 of the Liquor Control Act was a revenue
provision. The Johnson court also relied on the fact that the history of the Liquor Con-
trol Act supported the conclusion that § 8 was a revenue provision. Johnson, 125 Ill. 2d
at 11-14, 530 N.E.2d at 505-07.
96. 117 Ill. 2d 454, 512 N.E.2d 1240 (1987). The Searle court recognized for the first
time that the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution provides State taxpayers with
more protection than the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at
466-67, 512 N.E.2d at 1245.
97. Johnson, 125 Ill. 2d at 15, 530 N.E.2d at 507 (citing Searle, 117 Ill. 2d at 468, 512
N.E.2d at 1246).
98. Id.
99. See supra note 85 regarding the source of the product's alcoholic content.
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statutory definitions of "wine' and "spirits,"'' 1 which distin-
guish between the products based on production method.1 °2 The
court rejected the DOR's argument, concluding that the definitions
were not intended to provide for a tax structure based solely on the
method of production.10 3
The court then applied the second part of the Searle test and
considered whether the classifications bear a reasonable relation-
ship to the legislation's purpose."°4 Noting that the Liquor Control
Act's purpose is to encourage moderate consumption of alcohol, 105
the court concluded that the imposition of different rates upon two
products containing the same percentage of alcohol would frus-
trate the objective underlying the Act.1°6 The court stated, how-
ever, that its decision should not be construed to mean that wine
coolers and New Products must constitutionally be taxed at the
same rate as wine. 107 The court's holding was limited to a require-
ment that wine coolers and New Products be taxed at the same
rate. 108
100. Section 1-3.03 of the Liquor Control Act defines wine as "any alcoholic beverage
obtained by the fermentation of the natural contents of fruits, or vegetables, containing
sugar, including such beverages when fortified by the addition of alcohol or spirits, as
above defined." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, para. 95.03 (1985).
101. Section 1-3.02 of the Liquor Control Act defines spirits as "any beverage which
contains alcohol obtained by distillation, mixed with water or other substance in solution,
and includes brandy, rum, whiskey, gin, or other spirituous liquors, and such liquors
when rectified, blended or otherwise mixed with alcohol or other substances." Id. para.
95.02 (1985).
102. Johnson, 125 Ill. 2d at 15-16, 530 N.E.2d at 507.
103. Id. The court stated that basing a definition of wine, beer and spirits solely on
the method of production without considering the alcohol content in each product ig-
nores that the production method determines the amount of alcohol in the product. Id.
at 16, 530 N.E.2d at 507. The court reviewed the production processes and noted that all
alcohol begins with either the fermentation of cereal grains (producing beer) or fruits and
vegetables containing sugar (producing wine). Id. at 17, 530 N.E.2d 508. Spirits are
produced by distilling the fermented fruits and vegetables. Id. at 18, 530 N.E.2d at 508-
09. The court determined that the alcohol in spirits and wine was qualitatively the same.
The difference between the two products is the higher alcohol content in spirits, which
results from the distillation process. Id. at 18, 530 N.E.2d at 509. The court concluded
that because the product created by mixing spirits with fruit juices (New Products) was
qualitatively the same as a wine cooler and also contained the same alcohol by volume,
there was no real and substantial difference between the products to support the different
tax rate. Id.
104. Id. at 19, 530 N.E.2d at 509.
105. Id. at 20, 530 N.E.2d at 509.
106. Id. at 21, 530 N.E.2d at 510.
107. Id. The supreme court reversed the appellate court's holding to the extent that it
required New Products to be taxed at the same rate as wine. Id.
108. Id. In specially concurring with the majority's decision, Justice Miller empha-
sized that the court's holding did not preclude the legislature from placing New Products
and wine coolers in a different category from wine and did not address the question of
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The court's decision in Johnson affirms the approach the court
adopted in Searle Pharmaceuticals. The decision will continue to
direct taxpayer's attention to the uniformity clause of the Illinois
Constitution as a viable means of attacking use taxes and the like,
instead of, or in addition to, the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution.
C Property Taxes
1. Exemption for Airport Authority Uses
Section 19.20 of the Revenue Act of 1939 provides an exemption
from property tax for Airport Authority property used for "Air-
port Authority purposes."' 1 9 In Harrisburg-Raleigh Airport v. De-
partment of Revenue, 110 the Illinois Supreme Court consolidated
two cases involving the use of Airport Authority property111 and
concluded that the tax exemption extends to property leased by a
public airport authority to private parties for private purposes, pro-
vided the private purposes have a "real and substantial relation to
the authority's statutory purpose of maintaining a public
airport."1 12
The property in the first case consisted of twenty aircraft han-
gars owned by the Harrisburg-Raleigh Airport Authority ("Har-
risburg Airport"). 1 3 The Harrisburg Airport rented these hangars
to the public for storage of private aircraft."I4 After the DOR de-
nied the property tax exempt status, Harrisburg Airport brought
this action seeking a reversal of the DOR's denial."I5 The circuit
court held for Harrisburg Airport and reversed the DOR's de-
whether the uniformity provision of the Illinois Constitution would prohibit tax struc-
tures that are not based on the percentage of alcohol by volume contained in a particular
item. Id. at 23-24, 530 N.E.2d at 511 (Miller, J., specially concurring).
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 500.20 (1987). Section 19.20 confers tax exempt
status to "[a]ll property of every kind belonging to any Airport Authority and used for
Airport Authority purposes." Id. (emphasis added).
110. 126 Ill. 2d 326, 533 N.E.2d 1072 (1989).
111. Harrisburg-Raleigh, 126 Ill. 2d at 329, 533 N.E.2d at 1073. See 163 Ill. App. 3d
253, 516 N.E.2d 967 (5th Dist. 1987) and Fox Valley Airport Auth. v. Department of
Revenue, 164 Ill. App. 3d 415, 517 N.E.2d 1200 (2d Dist. 1987); see also in Bush and
O'Keefe, Real Property and Real Estate Transactions, 21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 569, 588
(1990).
112. 126 Ill. 2d at 336, 533 N.E.2d at 1076.
113. Id. at 330, 533 N.E.2d at 1073.
114. Id. The court noted that the hangars were available on a first come, first served
basis and were rented on a monthly basis, although some tenants paid a year's rent in
advance. Id.
115. Id. The action was brought in the circuit court of Saline County.
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nial. 116 On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court's
decision, holding that the hangars were entitled to tax exempt sta-
tus.117 After granting the DOR's petition for leave to appeal, the
supreme court considered whether the leasing of the hangars was
an "Airport Authority purpose" within the meaning of section
19.20.118
First, the court rejected the DOR's argument that the term
"Airport Authority purpose" was limited to the "public use" of
property.' 19 The court noted under the DOR's interpretation, sec-
tion 19.20 is rendered superfluous120 because section 19.9,121 which
has been interpreted to apply to municipal airports, provides an
exemption for public grounds used exclusively for public pur-
poses.122 Next, the court noted that although a number of statutes
exempting property from taxation contain provisions excluding
from the exemption property leased to private parties, section
19.20 does not contain such exclusionary language.' 23 Finally, the
inclusion of a separate exemption for airport authority uses, in
light of section 19.9's more narrowly defined exemption, indicates
that the uses do not have to be exclusively for public purposes.1 24
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 331, 533 N.E.2d at 1073.
119. Id. at 331-32, 533 N.E.2d at 1074. The DOR claimed that section 7 of "An act
in relation to Airport Authorities" controls the meaning of "Airport Authority pur-
poses." Id. Section 7 provides in pertinent part:
The establishment and continued maintenance and operation of safe, adequate
and necessary public airports and public airport facilities. . . and the creation of
airport authorities having powers necessary or desirable for the establishment
and continued maintenance and operation of such airports and facilities are de-
clared and determined to be in the public interest, and such powers and the
corporate purposes and functions of such authorities, as herein stated, are de-
clared to be public and governmental in nature and essential to the public
interest.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 15 1/2, para. 68.7 (1987).
120. Harrisburg-Raleigh, 126 Ill. 2d at 334, 533 N.E.2d at 1075. The court noted
that "there is a strong presumption against finding statutory language to be mere surplus-
age." Id.
121. Section 19.9 provides tax exempt status for "public grounds owned by a munici-
pal corporation and used exclusively for public purposes." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
para. 500.9 (1987).
122. Harrisburg-Raleigh, 126 Ill. 2d at 334, 533 N.E.2d at 1075.
123. Id. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 500.10 (1987) (all property "which
may be used exclusively by societies for agricultural ... purposes, and not for pecuniary
profit"); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 500.16 (1987) ("parking areas not leased or used
for profit").
124. 126 Ill. 2d at 334-35, 533 N.E.2d at 1075. The court noted that the nature of the
leases--short term, available to all members of the flying public, leased on a first-come-
first-served basis-supports the argument that the leasing of the hangars served the "pub-
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Relying on the inclusion of the separate exemption for airport au-
thority uses, the supreme court held that the exemption extends to
private uses of airport authority property bearing a real and sub-
stantial relationship to the operation of a public airport. 25
In the second case, the supreme court considered the property
that was owned by the Fox Valley Airport Authority ("Fox Valley
Airport")." 6 Fox Valley Airport sought a property tax exemption
for six parcels of land used for private storage or maintenance of
aircraft ("private storage parcel"),2 7 a parcel of land containing a
residence that was leased to a private party ("residence parcel"), 21
and a parcel of land containing a farmhouse leased to an employee
of the airport and three outbuildings used by the airport for storage
("farmhouse parcel"). 29 After the DOR denied a portion of the
tax exemptions, 3 ° the matter was brought before the circuit court
of DuPage County for administrative review.'
The circuit court reversed the DOR's decision and ordered that
all the land be exempted. 3 2 On appeal, the appellate court af-
firmed the exemption for the private storage parcel but reversed as
to the private residence parcel and the farmhouse parcel. 33 The
DOR appealed the decision to the Illinois Supreme Court as to the
six parcels held exempt, and Fox Valley Airport cross-appealed
lic airport's statutory function as a terminus for private, as well as public and commercial
aircraft." Id. at 335, 533 N.E.2d at 1075. The court concluded by distinguishing the
facts of this case from numerous cases from other jurisdictions that hold that leasing
hangars or other airport property to private individuals is not an exempt use, noting that
none of these courts dealt with a separate exemption for airport authority property. Id.
at 336, 530 N.E.2d at 1075. See, e.g., Salina Airport Auth. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 13
Kan. App. 2d 80, 761 P.2d 1261 (1988), superseded by statute as stated in Tri-County
Public Airport Auth. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 245 Kan. 301, 777 P.2d 843 (1989);
City of Cleveland v. Perk, 2 Ohio St. 2d 173, 207 N.E.2d 556 (1965); Chemung County v.
Hartman, 24 A.D.2d 1063, 265 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1965); Town of Harrison v. County of
Westchester, 13 N.Y.2d 258, 196 N.E.2d 240, (1963). The court also noted that exemp-
tions for specific uses of public property have been construed more broadly. Harrisburg-
Raleigh, 126 Ill. 2d at 336, 533 N.E.2d at 1076.
125. Id. at 336, 533 N.E.2d at 1076.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 336-37, 533 N.E.2d at 1076.
128. Id. at 337, 533 N.E.2d at 1076.
129. Id. at 337, 533 N.E.2d at 1076-77.
130. Id. at 336-37, 533 N.E.2d at 1076. The DOR denied the tax exemption for six of
the parcels, allowed a 26% exemption for one parcel and an one-third exemption for
another parcel. Id.
131. Id. at 337, 533 N.E.2d at 1076.
132. Id.
133. Id. The appellate court held that 74% of the farmhouse parcel and 100% of the
residence parcel were subject to taxation. Id.
Taxation
with respect to the two parcels denied the full exemption. 134
The supreme court first considered the six parcels of land that
were being used for private storage or maintenance of aircraft. The
supreme court affirmed the appellate court's decision, noting that
the use of the property bore a "real and substantial relationship to
airport authority purposes."'' 35
The court then considered the Fox Valley Airport's cross-appeal
regarding the remaining two parcels of land. 136 Although Fox Val-
ley Airport conceded that the properties were being used partially
for non-airport authority purposes, 137 it claimed that the properties
were still eligible for the exemption because they were also being
used for future expansion of the airport.'38 Fox Valley Airport fur-
ther claimed that the entire value of the property was exempt from
taxation because section 19.20 does not require that the property
be used "exclusively" for airport authority purposes. 139
The court disagreed with the idea that property used partially
for airport authority purposes is exempt when it is being used pri-
marily for non-exempt purposes.'" Although the court acknowl-
edged that section 19.20 does not contain the word "exclusive," the
court concluded that the language "and used for Airport Author-
ity purposes" required that the current, primary use of the prop-
erty be airport-related.141 Because the current, primary uses of the
properties were not airport-related, the supreme court affirmed the
appellate court's decision.14 2
2. Extinguishment of In Rem Liens
In Rosewell v. Park Place Investments,43 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that once an in rem tax lien is extinguished by section
134. Id. at 338, 533 N.E.2d at 1077.
135. Id. at 342, 533 N.E.2d at 1079.
136. Id.
137. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
138. 126 Ill. 2d at 342, 533 N.E.2d at 1079. Fox Valley Airport claimed that this was
an exempt use because an airport authority has the power to acquire property to be used
or useful for the expansion of the airport. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 15 1/2, para.
68.8-(2) (1987)).
139. 126 I11. 2d at 342, 533 N.E.2d at 1079.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 343, 533 N.E.2d at 1079. The court cautioned that this conclusion was
not in conflict with its holding regarding the other property at issue. Id. at 344, 533
N.E.2d at 1079. The court stated that the use may have an element of private benefit as
long as it bears a substantial relationship to the purpose of operating a public airport. Id.
142. Id. at 343, 533 N.E.2d at 1079.
143. 127 I11. 2d 404, 537 N.E.2d 762 (1989); see also in Bush and O'Keefe, Real
Property and Real Estate Transactions, 21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 569, 584 (1990).
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235a of the Revenue Act of 1934,'"1 the tax lien is no longer pres-
ent and the county cannot attempt to enforce the lien by a subse-
quent sale. 145
Section 235a permits a county treasurer to sell tax delinquent
properties that are five or more years behind in the payment of real
estate taxes.146 In Park Place, the Cook County Treasurer sold
various parcels of tax delinquent real estate owned by the appel-
lees. ' 47 Although the circuit court confirmed the sales, none of the
purchasers petitioned for or received tax deeds, nor did the delin-
quent taxpayers redeem. 14  When the Treasurer attempted to in-
clude these parcels in a subsequent tax sale, the appellees brought
different actions to halt the sale. 149 The circuit court consolidated
the cases and entered an order halting the sale of the properties. 5 o
The Treasurer appealed the decision directly to the Illinois
Supreme Court, 5 I contending that the failure of the purchaser to
obtain a deed revives the tax lien by virtue of section 271 of the
1934 Revenue Act. 152
144. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 716a (1987). Section 235a provides in pertinent
part: "[u]pon confirmation, a sale pursuant to this Section shall extinguish the in rem lien
of the general taxes, special taxes and special assessments for which judgment has been
entered and a redemption shall not revive the lien." Id.
145. Park Place, 127 Ill. 2d at 413, 537 N.E.2d at 766.
146. Id. at 406, 537 N.E.2d at 763. Under this section, the county treasurer sells the
property to the highest bidder. The circuit court confirms the sale and issues a tax certifi-
cate to the successful bidder. Upon confirmation, the county's lien is extinguished and a
new lien arises by operation of law in favor of the purchaser. Although the circuit court
may confirm a sale, the sale is not complete until the bidder is issued a tax deed by the
court. (The issue in Park Place was whether an extinguished lien would be revived in the
event the sale was not completed.) In order to receive a tax deed, the bidder must petition
the court for the deed within the statutory time period. If the owner does not redeem the
property by paying the delinquent taxes plus penalties to the county clerk (redemption is
the amount bid in the case of a single family residence), the deed will be issued and the
sale complete. Id. If the bidder does not receive the tax deed, title vests with the original
owner. Id. at 411, 537 N.E.2d at 765. This provision is commonly referred to as the
Scavenger Act.
147. Id. at 405, 537 N.E.2d at 763.
148. Id. at 407, 537 N.E.2d at 763.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 407, 537 N.E.2d at 764. The trial court concluded that the language of
235a clearly indicated that the liens were extinguished when the sales were confirmed.
Id.
151. Id. at 406, 537 N.E.2d at 763. The Treasurer filed a motion for a direct appeal
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(b). Id. Rule 302(b) permits a direct appeal to the
supreme court for cases in which the public interest requires expeditious determination.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 302(b) (Supp. 1988).
152. 127 Ill. 2d at 408, 537 N.E.2d at 764. Section 271 of the Revenue Act provides:
[u]nless the holder of the certificate for real estate purchased at any tax sale
under this Act takes out the deed in the time provided by law, and files the same
for record within one year from and after the time for redemption expires, the
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In resolving this issue, the supreme court noted that the lan-
guage of section 235a appeared to extinguish the County's in rem
tax lien upon court confirmation of the sale. 153 The court then ad-
dressed the Treasurer's contention that section 235a must be read
together with section 271, and that the liens that were extinguished
under section 235a retroactively were revived when the sale be-
came "absolutely null and void" under section 271. I51 The court
determined that this reasoning ignored the straightforward lan-
guage of section 271, which specifically provides that the sale will
be void "from and after the expiration of such one year."' 55 Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that the extinguished in rem tax
liens were not retroactively revived by operation of section 271 and
therefore could not be enforced by the county at a later sale. 15 6
As in the Parvin decision, 157 although the cases involve, at least
for the general public, relatively obscure questions, the decisions by
the Illinois Supreme Court in the area of property taxation repre-
sent a matter-of-fact, no-nonsense approach to statutory
construction.
III. LOCAL TAXATION ISSUES
A. Chicago Sales Tax
In Geary v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc.,158 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that tampons and sanitary napkins are medical appli-
ances within the meaning of the Chicago Sales Tax Ordinance159
certificate or deed, and the sale on which it is based, shall, from and after the
expiration of such one year, be absolutely null and void with no right to
reimbursement.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 752 (1987).
153. Park Place, 127 Ill. 2d at 409, 537 N.E.2d at 765.
154. Id.
155. Id. The court noted that the Treasurer's reasoning required a retroactive appli-
cation of section 271. The court declined to do so since there was no indication that the
legislature intended such an application. Moreover, the court noted that the Treasurer's
reasoning would render the language "from and after" superfluous because it would make
the sale void before the expiration of one year after the time for redemption expires. Id.
at 409, 537 N.E.2d at 765. The court declined to adopt such a construction, noting that
"[a] court should not adopt a construction which renders language in a statute superflu-
ous." Id. at 409-10, 537 N.E.2d at 765 (citing In re Application of Rosewell, 117 Ill. 2d
479, 486, 512 N.E.2d 1256, 1259 (1987)).
156. Id. at 412-13, 537 N.E.2d at 765-66.
157. See supra notes 79-112 and accompanying text (for discussion of Parvin).
158. 129 II1. 2d 389, 544 N.E.2d 344 (1989).
159. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 200.6-1 (1984). The Chicago Sales Tax Ordi-
nance exempts medical appliances from the imposition of sales tax. Id. ch. 200.6-4
(1984).
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and are therefore exempt from sales taxation. 160 The court further
held that the plaintiffs' claims were not barred by the voluntary
payment doctrine 61 because plaintiffs had made a sufficient show-
ing of duress. 162
The plaintiffs in Geary filed a class action suit alleging that the
Chicago Sales Tax imposed on the purchase of tampons and sani-
tary napkins was an illegal tax. 163  The circuit court of Cook
County denied the defendants' motion to strike and dismiss plain-
tiffs' complaint, holding that the plaintiffs' claims were not barred
by the voluntary payment doctrine and that tampons and sanitary
napkins were exempt from sales tax. The appellate court reversed
the circuit court's holding regarding the voluntary payment doc-
trine,' 64 and therefore did not address the issue of whether the
products were medical appliances.16 The plaintiffs appealed to the
Illinois Supreme Court. 6
6
The supreme court found that its earlier decisions in Getto v.
City of Chicago 167 and Ross v. City of Geneva 161 were controlling on
160. Geary, 129 Ill. 2d at 415, 544 N.E.2d at 355.
161. The voluntary payment doctrine precludes a taxpayer from recovering taxes vol-
untarily paid. Id. at 393, 544 N.E.2d at 346.
162. Id. at 408, 544 N.E.2d at 353. The voluntary payment doctrine does not pre-
clude the recovery of taxes paid if the taxpayer paid the taxes under duress. Id. at 393,
544 N.E.2d at 346.
163. Id. at 392, 544 N.E.2d at 346. The defendants named in the suit were the direc-
tor of the Illinois Department of Revenue, the City of Chicago, the Director of the Chi-
cago Department of Revenue, the Regional Transportation Authority, Dominick's Finer
Foods, Jewel Foods Stores, Inc., Walgreens Co. and K-mart Corporation. Id.
164. Id. at 393, 544 N.E.2d at 346. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs
did not plead duress by pleading that the products were a necessity and therefore they
had not sufficiently pled that they paid the taxes involuntarily. Id. at 392-93, 544 N.E.2d
at 345-346.
165. Id. at 393, 544 N.E.2d at 346.
166. Id.
167. 86 Ill. 2d 39, 426 N.E.2d 844 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982). The
plaintiff in Getto challenged the method used in calculating the "message tax"-a tax
imposed on his source of telephone service. Id. at 42, 426 N.E.2d at 846. Prior to filing
suit, however, the plaintiff had paid his bills without protest. Id. at 45, 426 N.E.2d at
848. The plaintiff claimed he paid the bills involuntarily because he feared that his tele-
phone service would be terminated if he did not pay the tax. Id. at 46, 426 N.E.2d at 848.
The Getto court found that the possible threat of termination of the service constituted
duress that would forbid the application of the voluntary payment doctrine. Id. at 51,
426 N.E.2d at 851.
168. 71 Ill. 2d 27, 373 N.E.2d 1342. The plaintiff in Ross challenged a 10%
surcharge added to his electric bill by the defendant public utility. Id. at 30-31, 373
N.E.2d at 1344. Plaintiff had indicated on his check that he was making the payment
under protest. Id. at 31, 373 N.E.2d at 1344. The plaintiff then sought a refund of the
surcharge claiming he had not paid the surcharge voluntarily. Id. at 30-31, 373 N.E.2d
at 1344. The court concluded that termination of the plaintiff's electrical service would
Taxation
the issue of whether the plaintiffs had made a sufficient pleading of
duress under the voluntary payment doctrine. 69 In both cases, the
court found duress existed because an essential service would have
been terminated if the plaintiff had not paid the taxes. 170 The court
determined that the current case was similar because sanitary nap-
kins and tampons are necessities of life,' 7' and the plaintiffs would
have been unable to obtain the products unless they paid the
taxes. 7
2
The supreme court then addressed the defendants' argument
that tampons and sanitary napkins are necessities, without addi-
tional facts, was insufficient to establish duress.' 73  First, the de-
fendants claimed that the plaintiffs should have pleaded that it was
not possible to buy the products without paying the tax. 174 The
supreme court concluded that it would have been "absurd" and
"burdensome" to require the plaintiffs to check every retail store in
the city or state to determine whether they could have purchased
the products without paying the tax. 175 Next, the defendants ar-
gued that the plaintiffs should have alleged that "they could not
purchase the products from the retail defendants without paying
the taxes or that any attempt to do so would have been useless."'' 76
The court determined that requiring the plaintiff's to allege this
would have been a "useless" act because retail stores do not sell a
product unless the purchaser pays the tax. 177 Finally, the defend-
ants asserted that the plaintiffs should have pled that "the retail
defendants threatened or compelled plaintiffs to pay the taxes, or
that the retail defendants had an established policy of refusing to
sell products in the event a customer refused to pay the taxes.' 71
The court rejected this claim, noting that the Getto court did not
have been disastrous, thus the plaintiff acted prudently by paying the surcharge rather
than risking the termination of the essential service. Id. at 33-34, 373 N.E.2d at 1345.
169. Geary, 129 Ill. 2d at 398, 544 N.E.2d at 348.
170. Id. The court noted that both the essential nature of the service and the conse-
quence of non-payment were significant factors in finding duress. Id.
171. Id. The court concluded that the products are necessities because they are the
only ones available to women for use during their menstrual periods. Id.
172. Id. at 398, 544 N.E.2d at 349. The court noted that the "[p]laintiffs had to pay
the taxes or do without the tampons and sanitary napkins Uust as] the plaintiffs in Getto
and Ross had to pay the taxes or do without telephone or electric service." Id. at 399, 544
N.E.2d at 349.
173. Id. at 399, 544 N.E.2d at 349.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 400, 544 N.E.2d at 349.
178. Id. at 399, 544 N.E.2d at 349.
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require the plaintiff to prove these things; therefore, there was no
reason to require the Geary plaintiffs to prove or plead such
facts. 17 9
The supreme court agreed with the appellate court's holding
that "in order to constitute duress the payee must exert some ac-
tual or threatened power over the payor from which the latter has
no immediate relief except by paying the tax,"18 but concluded
that such duress was present.18' Accordingly, the supreme court
held that the plaintiffs had made a sufficient pleading of duress by
alleging that tampons and sanitary napkins are necessities of life
that they purchased with no choice but to pay the taxes. 82
The court then considered whether tampons and sanitary nap-
kins are "medical appliances" within the meaning of the Chicago
Sales Tax Ordinance.18 3 In resolving this issue, the court noted
that both the State of Illinois' and the City's sales tax ordinances
exempt medical appliances from sales tax'84 and that the DOR and
the Chicago Department of Revenue ("Revenue") had issued vir-
tually identical regulations defining medical appliances. 8 5 More-
179. Id. at 401, 544 N.E.2d at 350. Specifically, the court noted that the Getto plain-
tiff did not prove that the defendant had threatened or coerced him, nor did he prove that
the telephone company had an established policy of disconnecting service to customers
who had not paid their bills. Id.
180. Id. at 402, 544 N.E.2d at 350. The appellate court concluded that such duress
was not present. Id.
181. Id. The supreme court determined that the "actual or threatened power" was
the power the retail defendant possessed to refuse to sell the products and because the
products were necessities, the plaintiff had no immediate relief other than paying the tax.
Id.
182. Id. at 408, 544 N.E.2d at 353.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 409-10, 544 N.E.2d at 354. The Chicago Sales Tax Ordinance provides an
exemption from the sales tax for the following: "purchase or use of food for human
consumption which is to be consumed off the premises where it is sold ... prescription
and non-prescription medicines, drugs, medical appliances and insulin, urine testing
materials, syringes, and needles used by diabetics; for human use." CHICAGO, ILL.,
MUN. CODE ch. 200.6-4(i) (1984) (emphasis added). The Retailers' Occupation Tax Act
and the Use Tax Act provide an exemption from tax for: "food for human consumption
which is to be consumed off the premises where it is sold ... and prescription and non-
prescription medicines, drugs, medical appliances and insulin, urine testing materials, syr-
inges and needles used by diabetics." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, paras. 439.3, 441 (Supp.
1988) (emphasis added).
185. Geary, 129 Ill. 2d at 410, 544 N.E.2d at 354. The Revenue Department regula-
tion defines medical appliance as follows:
A medical appliance is an item intended by the maker to correct any function-
ing part of the body or is used as a substitute for any functioning part of the
body, such as artificial limbs, crutches, wheelchairs, stretchers, hearing aids,
corrective eyeglasses, sterile cotton or bandaids, and the like. Medical appli-
ances also include testing equipment such as blood pressure kits, thermometers,
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over, the State had construed the term medical appliances to
include tampons and sanitary napkins, and both the Chicago City
Council and Revenue had expressed an intent to administer and
enforce the City's Sales Tax Ordinance in a manner consistent with
the State's administration and enforcement of its sales tax stat-
utes.186 Although the court recognized that Revenue's regulation
specifically addressed medical appliances, 18 7 it determined that be-
cause the definition set forth in the City's and State's regulations
were virtually identical, there was no evidence that Revenue ex-
pressly departed from the State's position regarding medical appli-
ances, other than its present position.188 The court concluded that
Revenue's interpretation of "medical appliance" was inconsistent
with its own regulation and the City Council's desire to enforce
urine testing kits, and the like. However, supplies such as non-sterile cotton
swabs, disposable diapers, toilet paper, tissues, towelettes, and the like do not
qualify for the exemption. Likewise, cosmetics such as lipsticks, perfume, hair
tonics and the like, do not qualify for the exemption.
CITY OF CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, REGULATION 1.200.6-4(i)(2) (December
12, 1982).
The DOR's regulation defines medical appliance as follows:
A medical appliance is an item which is intended by the maker to correct any
functioning part of the body or which is used as a substitute for any functioning
part of the body, such as artificial limbs, crutches, wheelchairs, stretchers, hear-
ing aids, corrective eyeglasses, dental prostheses, and sterile cotton, bandages
and bandaids. The term "medical appliance" also includes testing equipment
used by an individual to test his or her own medical condition.
86 ILL. ADM. CODE § 130.310(c)(2) (Supp. 1986). Subsection (4) continues, "[s]upplies,
such as non-sterile cotton swabs, disposable diapers, toilet paper, tissues and towelettes
do not qualify for the reduced rate. Cosmetics, such as lipsticks, perfume and hair tonics
do not qualify for the reduced rate." Id. § 130.310(c)(4) (Supp. 1986).
186. Geary, 129 Ill. 2d at 412, 544 N.E.2d at 355. The court noted that when the
State excluded soft drinks from its sales tax exemption, the city council passed a similar
amendment which provided "[ilt is the City's desire to maintain consistency in the ad-
ministration and enforcement of the Chicago Sales Tax as compared to such State taxes
to the extent practicable." Id. (quoting City Counsel of Chicago, Official Journal of The
Proceedings, September 6, 1984 at 9022). The court also noted that the Chicago Depart-
ment's Sales Ruling No. 3 expressed a similar intent as follows:
The Illinois Use Tax [citation] contains many provisions which are identical to
that of the Chicago Sales Tax. Therefore, for administrative convenience and
uniformity in the enforcement of such taxes, the Department of Revenue will
allow persons who are subject to the State of Illinois Use Tax to follow the State
rules and regulations with respect to that tax in complying with the City of
Chicago Sales Tax. However, this will only be allowed where the State rules
and regulations apply to a statutory provision in the Use Tax Act which is
identical to the one in the Chicago Sales Tax Ordinance and which has not been
specifically addressed in any Chicago Sales Tax Rule [or] Regulation.
City of Chicago Department of Revenue, Ruling No. 3 (December 18, 1982).
187. 129 Ill. 2d at 413, 544 N.E.2d at 356.
188. Id.
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ordinances uniformly with the State Sales Tax.189 Accordingly, the
court held that Revenue's definition of medical appliances encom-
passes tampons and sanitary napkins, and therefore the products
are exempt from the City's sales tax. 19°
The court's decision in Geary is noteworthy (and refreshing) for
the approach it adopts with respect to the application of the volun-
tary payment doctrine. Otherwise, the case is not particularly
significant.
B. Chicago Transaction Tax Ordinance
In Meites v. City of Chicago,'91 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the First District upheld the imposition of the Chicago transaction
tax' 92 on charges billed for online database searches on a comput-
erized legal library system. 193
The plaintiffs in Meites, subscribers to Mead Data Central's
Lexis/Nexis databases, filed a complaint in the circuit court of
Cook County challenging the imposition of the transaction tax on
charges billed for database searches. 94 The plaintiffs alleged that
the Chicago transaction tax ordinance did not authorize the tax on
database searches and that Revenue's interpretation of the ordi-
nance195 was overly broad and invalid. 196 The trial court ruled in
189. Id.
190. Id. at 414-15, 544 N.E.2d at 356-57.
191. 184 Ill. App. 3d 887, 540 N.E.2d 973 (1st Dist. 1989), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d
114 (1989).
192. The Transaction Tax Ordinance provides in pertinent part:
There is hereby imposed and shall immediately accrue and be collected a tax...
on ... [t]ransactions consummated in the City of Chicago involving the lease or
rental of any personal property.... The ultimate incidence of and liability for
payment of said tax shall be borne by the lessee.... Personal property shall also
mean leased time on equipment not otherwise itself rented, such as leased time
for the use of calculators, computers ... , whether said leased time is fully or
partially utilized.
CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 200.1-2A.
193. Meites, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 895, 540 N.E.2d at 979. The appellate court's deci-
sion is final. The Illinois Supreme Court has denied the plaintiffs' petition for leave to
appeal. Meites v. City of Chicago, 127 Ill. 2d 620, 545 N.E.2d 114 (October 5, 1989)
(Table No. 68974).
194. Meites, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 888, 540 N.E.2d at 974.
195. Under City of Chicago, Department of Revenue Ruling No. 9, the transaction
tax ordinance authorizes the collection of the tax on: "all lease or rental charges associ-
ated with the usage of the computer and its software in the City of Chicago." City of
Chicago Department of Revenue, Ruling No. 9. The ruling also states: "[s]eparately
stated optional charges not for the use of its computer, its software or other personal
property used in the city shall not be subject to the Chicago Transaction Tax. An exam-
ple would be separately stated maintenance charges which are optional." Id.
196. Meites, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 888, 540 N.E.2d at 974.
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favor of the City,'97 and the plaintiffs appealed. 198
The appellate court first addressed whether the Chicago transac-
tion tax ordinance authorizes the imposition of the tax on database
search charges. 19 9 The City imposed the transaction tax on both
charges made for "connect time" 2°° and charges made for online
database searches.20 The plaintiffs did not challenge the imposi-
tion of the tax on "connect time," but rather disputed the imposi-
tion of the tax on charges made for database searches. 2  Noting
that the two charges are billed separately, the plaintiffs asserted
that the transaction tax ordinance authorizes the tax on charges for
leased time only, not on charges for the use of the computer.0 3
The City claimed that Revenue's Ruling No. 9 is persuasive au-
thority, in absence of a showing that it is clearly erroneous, arbi-
trary or unreasonable. 204 The City also argued that accessing and
using a computer system is one transaction. 20 5
The court concluded that the ordinance authorized the imposi-
tion of the tax on the database search charges.2°6 The court noted
that Revenue's Rule No. 9 was not erroneous, arbitrary or unrea-
sonable, and that the plaintiff had not cited any authority for its
contention that the tax cannot be applied to charges that were not
time-based.20 7
Next, the appellate court considered whether the tax on a charge
for searches is a tax on occupation in violation of the Illinois Con-
stitution. 0 The plaintiff contended that the search charges consti-
tuted fees for service rendered by Mead, and a tax on that service is
197. Id. at 888, 540 N.E.2d at 974.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 888-89, 540 N.E.2d at 974-75.
200. Mead defines connect time as "each unit of time that [s]ubscriber is in contact
with MDC's central computer, beginning with the transmission of an identification
number and ending when the connection is terminated." Id. at 889, 540 N.E.2d at 975.
201. Id. at 889, 540 N.E.2d at 975. Mead defines online database searches as "each
execution of a command by [s]ubscriber that requests information to be located or re-
trieved from a file." Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 889-90, 540 N.E.2d at 975.
204. Id. at 890-91, 540 N.E.2d at 976.
205. Id. at 891, 540 N.E.2d at 976. The City argued that "accessing Mead's system
without proceeding to use the system to search for and retrieve information is of no
practical value and a waste of resources." Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. Article VII, section 6(e) of the Illinois Constitution prohibits home rule units
from imposing occupation taxes without authorization from the General Assembly. ILL.
CONST. art. VII, § 6(e). The section provides in pertinent part: "[a]home rule unit shall
have only the power that the General Assembly may provide by law ... to license for
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an illegal tax on occupation. 2°9
The court determined that Mead was not providing a service to
plaintiff by leasing the computers. The court relied on Webster v.
City of Chicago,21° wherein the court determined that the leasing of
personal, tangible property was not a service and, therefore, the
imposition of the tax on the charges was not prohibited by article
VII, section 6(e) of the Illinois Constitution. 2 1 Accordingly, the
court concluded that because the transaction tax was not imposed
on a service provided by Mead, it was not an impermissible tax on
occupations.212
The appellate court's decision in Meites is consistent with the
Illinois Supreme Court's decision last year in Illinois Gasoline
Dealers Association v. City of Chicago2 3 and Chicago Health Clubs,
Inc. v. Picur.21' The court's conclusion supports the distinction
made by Justice Ryan in Picur between Illinois Gasoline Dealers
and Picur.21 5 The tax in Meites was on the use of tangible personal
property (i.e., Mead's computers), as was the tax in Illinois Gaso-
revenue or impose taxes upon or measured by income or earnings or upon occupations."
Id.
209. Meites, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 891, 540 N.E.2d at 976.
210. 132 Ill. App. 3d 666, 478 N.E.2d 446 (1st Dist. 1985).
211. Meites, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 892, 540 N.E.2d at 977. The plaintiffs in Webster
claimed that the leasing of personal property constituted a service and, therefore, impos-
ing the transaction tax on leasing was an impermissible occupation tax. Webster, 132 Ill.
App. 3d at 668, 478 N.E.2d at 447. The court concluded that the tax was not an invalid
tax on service because the tax was being imposed on the cost of the consumer's use and
temporary possession of tangible property. Id. at 669, 478 N.E.2d at 448. The appellate
court then addressed the plaintiffs' contention that under the decision in Chicago Health
Clubs, Inc. v. Picur, 124 Ill. 2d 1, 528 N.E.2d 978 (1988), a tax can be a tax on occupa-
tions regardless of whether it is a tax on services. Meites, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 894, 540
N.E.2d at 978. The Meites court noted that in Picur, the Illinois Supreme Court applied
a practical operation and effect test and concluded that an amendment to the Chicago
Amusement Tax, imposing the tax on health and racquetball clubs, was an illegal occupa-
tion tax. Id. at 893, 540 N.E.2d at 977. The Meites plaintiffs claimed that the Picur court
applied the practical operation and effect test without first determining whether the
amusement tax was a tax on service; therefore, there is no longer any need to determine
whether a tax is a tax on services for purposes of determining whether the tax is a tax on
occupations. Id. The Meites court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, noting that although
the Picur court did not indicate whether it had determined that the amendment was a tax
on services, the court probably had made that assumption. Id. at 894-95, 540 N.E.2d at
978. The Meites court concluded that it would not adopt the plaintiffs' interpretation of
the Picur holding because the Illinois Supreme Court did not expressly state that the
practical operation and effect test can be applied regardless of whether the challenged tax
was a service tax. Id. at 895, 540 N.E.2d at 978-79.
212. 184 Ill. App. 3d at 895, 540 N.E.2d at 979.
213. 119 Ill. 2d 391, 519 N.E.2d 447 (1988).
214. 124 Ill. 2d 1, 528 N.E.2d 978 (1988).
215. Id. at 16-17, 528 N.E.2d at 985 (Ryan, J., specially concurring).
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line Dealers. Accordingly, the court in Meites properly rejected the
practical effect analysis used by the court in Picur, which, unlike
the facts in Meites, involved a tax that was not imposed on the
transfer of property.
IV. CONCLUSION
Johnson,216 with its focus on the uniformity clause of the Illinois
Constitution as a means of attacking the validity of use taxes,
should prove to have the greatest impact upon state taxation in the
future.
216. See supra notes 81-108 and accompanying text.
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